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Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets
Civic Republicanism at Work
Brett H. McDonnell'
This paper argues for employee primacy in corporate governance.
"Employee primacy" has two elements: ultimate employee control over the
corporation, and an objective of maximizing employee welfare. In
methodology, the argument draws both upon economics, understood more
broadly than in most corporate law scholarship, and upon civic republican
ideas. The paper presents four different arguments favoring employee
primacy. (1) Employee primacy is likely to create the most surplus within
the corporation due to incentive effects and the wealth of information that
employees possess. (2) Corporations characterized by employee primacy are
more likely to be socially responsible, and hence generate fewer negative
externalities, than corporations characterized by shareholder primacy. (3)
Employee primacy will lead to a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and
political power. (4) Employee primacy will produce citizens better fit to
participate within a political democracy.
Introduction
The rise of law and economics scholarship in corporate law has been
connected to a strengthened focus on a shareholder primacy' model of corporate
governance. Law and economics-based scholarship began to dominate corporate
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor, University of Minnesota Law
School. I thank Bernard Adell, Brian Bix, Bernie Black, Kent Greenfield, Frank Gevurtz, Mark
Gould, Claire Hill, Peter Huang, Kate Litvak, Martin Malin, David McGowan, Beth Mintz,
Larry Mitchell, Eric Rasmussen, Paul Rubin, Chantal Thomas, Tom Tyler, Dirk Zetzsche, and
participants in the 2005 Sloan Program for the Study of Business in Society Retreat and the
2005 meetings of the Canadian Law and Economics Association and the Midwestern Law and
Economics Association for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1 By "shareholder primacy" I mean both shareholder control of ultimate decision-
making power within a corporation (i.e., through election of the board of directors) and the
goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. See infra notes 13 through 16 and accompanying text.
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law scholarship in the seventies and eighties. The work of Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel is emblematic of the growing influence of law and economics in
corporate law. They wrote a series of influential law review articles in the eighties,
culminating in their now-classic book, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. 2 At
around the same time, corporate governance scholarship, activism, and legal rules
and decision-making increasingly came to focus on maximizing the value of
corporate shares as the main objective of corporate law and life. The work of
Easterbrook and Fischel reflects this focus on shareholders, and helped to create it.3
Nowadays, law and economics, in softer and harder versions, has come to be the
dominant mode of analysis in corporate law scholarship, and shareholder primacy is
widely though not universally accepted as the goal of corporate law. 4
These trends are not inevitable. Law and economics is not the only way to
think about corporate law. Even if one does accept a law and economics
methodology, doing so does not entail that shareholder primacy is the proper goal of
corporate law. I challenge shareholder primacy as the appropriate model for
corporate law, arguing instead for employee primacy in corporate decision-making.
"Employee primacy" has two elements: ultimate employee control over the
corporation, and the maximization of employee welfare.
I defend employee primacy using two different sets of ideas. The first is law
and economics, but applied more broadly than usual within corporate law
scholarship. I recognize that corporate law has effects well beyond those usually
considered, and applying economic reasoning to that wider range of effects can lead
to very different conclusions about the optimal shape of corporate law.5 The second
set of ideas is civic republicanism. Writing on civic republicanism and on corporate
law rarely overlaps, but republican ideas can offer a very useful perspective on
corporate law. In my hands, at least, we will see much convergence between civic
2 FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW (1991).
3 See id. at 36-39.
4 For a particularly strong recent statement on the dominance of shareholder
primacy, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L. J. 439 (2001). The many papers of Lucian Arye Bebchuk exemplify the contemporary
approach.
5 In doing so this article shares much in common with a recent essay by William
Klein, which briefly but perceptively lays out the many different possible criteria one can use
in evaluating corporate law. See William Klein, Criteria for Good Laws of Business Association, 2
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 13 (2005).
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republicanism and a broadened approach to law and economics. I will focus on
several themes from civic republicanism. Active involvement in affairs affecting
one's life is important and valuable. Overly-great income and wealth inequality
threaten political democracy. Politics can and should strive to understand and
realize public good through political deliberation. Such deliberation in turn can help
citizens become virtuous and flourish as human beings.
6
In this essay, I will apply both civic republican ideals and a broader than
usual understanding of economics to thinking about the choice between shareholder
primacy and employee primacy. Various forms of employee participation in
corporate governance present a deep challenge to the shareholder primacy vision of
the corporation. Should employees have a significant role in making decisions
within the corporation, and if so, what decisions? Should employees elect some or
all members of the board of directors? Should the interests of employees count in
deciding what a corporation should do, even when employee interests clash with
shareholder interests?
I present four different arguments favoring employee primacy:
(1) Employee primacy is likely to create the most surplus within a
corporation due to incentive effects and the wealth of information that employees
possess; 7
(2) Corporations characterized by employee primacy are more likely to be
socially responsible, and hence generate fewer negative externalities, than
corporations characterized by shareholder primacy;8
(3) Employee primacy will lead to a more egalitarian distribution of wealth
and political power;9 and
(4) Employee primacy will produce citizens better fit to participate within a
political democracy. 10
The foregoing arguments suggest that employee primacy is attractive for
many reasons. A major question, then, is why we observe so little employee
participation in corporate governance, if its benefits are as great as suggested here.
Shouldn't firms that create such large benefits for their participants tend to do well
within a free market that allows them to grow and compete with other sorts of
6 See infra section III.
7 See infra section IV.
8 See infra section V.
9 See infra section VI.
10 See infra section VII.
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businesses? I suggest two responses to this challenge.1
First, businesses that adopt employee primacy may lack supporting
institutions, such as laws, that shareholder-run businesses enjoy in an economy
where the latter predominate. Success may breed success, and failure may breed
failure. Second, many of my arguments for employee primacy suggest external
effects on groups outside the core constituencies within corporations, and there is no
good reason to expect that markets on their own will cause corporations to
internalize those externalities. These two arguments suggest gains to be had from
interventions favoring employee primacy. However, we must approach with care -
possible gains from intervening will not always translate into actual gains.
Therefore, rather than requiring employee primacy of all corporations, I advocate
more restrained efforts such as subsidies, tax breaks, default rules of employee board
representation, and well-developed schemes of employee representation which
would provide corporations with an expanded menu of options. 12
This paper tackles a wide range of arguments against shareholder primacy,
each of which is quite involved. I plan to explore many of the specific arguments
more fully in future work. However, the arguments are inter-related, and
addressing them as a whole enables us to develop a broader context by which we
can understand each individual argument more fully. What follows, then, is both. a
sketch of and a preliminary defense for a research agenda on the role of employees
in corporate governance. Though only a preliminary sketch, the story it is trying to
tell is of central importance to modern economic and political life. Since at least the
mid-nineteenth century we have struggled with how to reconcile the efficiency of
large corporations with a vision of ordinary, hard-working people working together
as equals to create a better, more democratic community. Employee primacy can
help bring together competing themes that have dominated the American story for
much of its history.
I. Employee v. Shareholder Primacy
Observers of American corporate law have perceived a shareholder primacy
norm,13 although one can dispute that perception.14 Stephen Bainbridge has broken
11 See infra section VIII.
12 See infra section IX.
13 The number of possible references for this point is huge. Just to take some of the
leading lights, see Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
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down this norm into two parts: (1) the objective function of the corporation should
be to maximize shareholder wealth, and (2) shareholders should have ultimate
control over the corporation (via ultimate control over the board of directors). 15 The
assumed objective function appears mainly in fiduciary duty cases. As noted, it is
debatable how often courts really characterize that duty as running to shareholders,
rather than to the corporation generally, but, at least on occasion, courts do explicitly
focus on shareholders. 16 Shareholder election of directors, shareholder approval of
fundamental changes, and the ability of only shareholders to sue for violations of
fiduciary duty are the main sources of ultimate shareholder control over the
corporation.
This paper presents employee primacy as an altnerative to shareholder
primacy.1 7 Employee primacy challenges both parts of the shareholder primacy
LAW 36-38 (1991); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, supra note 4; Jonathan R. Macey, An
Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991).
14 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277
(1998); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1189 (2002).
15 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 573 (2003). Bainbridge accepts the first principle while
rejecting the second. Jill Fisch points out a third part to the norm: scholars use measures of
shareholder value, e.g. stock price event studies, to evaluate the effectiveness of corporate law
rules. See Jill Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J.
CORP. L. 637 (2006). This is an important point, but not particularly relevant for the argument
in this paper, so I will focus on the two elements of shareholder primacy stated in the text.
16 The classic case is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). Even
Dodge has serious limits -the court did mandate the payment of a dividend to shareholders,
but it refused to require Ford to limit the expansion of its operations as the plaintiffs had
requested. A major more-recent case is Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), which explicitly recognizes the principle of shareholder wealth
maximization, although Revlon duties arise in quite limited circumstances. Blasius Industries.
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) explicitly recognizes the principle of ultimate
shareholder control as central to the legitimation of board authority, but again it applies in
limited circumstances. Much of the time the business judgment rule blunts any strong duty to
shareholders. See Smith, supra note 14, at 309-10. Indeed, Dodge is hard to square with the
business judgment rule.
17 One could consider other groups as well-for instance, creditors, suppliers,
customers, and local communities. I will largely ignore these others (with a limited exception
in section V). In part that is because I am taking on quite enough in my consideration of
employees here, but in part it is because I believe that employees have a deeper claim to
consideration and involvement in the corporation. The corporation is central to the life and
livelihood of its employees in ways that are generally not true for other constituent groups.
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norm. A strong version of employee primacy would recognize two principles: the
maximization of employee well-being as the corporation's objective function, and
ultimate employee control over decisions within the corporation. Employee control
over decision-making can take many different forms. It helps to think about the
different forms of employee participation as varying along several different axes:
Employees may participate in decisions at different levels of a business. If
employees elect the board of directors, they are participating at a high level in the
broadest decisions affecting the business. If employees elect representatives to a
workplace safety committee within one particular plant, they are participating in
decisions that are narrower both as to the type of decision and as to how much of the
business is affected. 18
Employees may directly participate in a decision or elect representatives
who will act for them.
Which employees participate may vary, ranging from a small subset of
employees to all employees of the corporation.
Employees may help participate in a broad range of decisions, or only
limited types of decisions. For instance, employee involvement could be limited to
decision affecting workplace safety.
Employees may have sole discretion over a particular decision, or may share
decision-making authority with other groups. If they share authority, employees'
share in that authority may vary from a majority voice, to an equal voice, to a
minority voice.
Employees could be given the sole standing to sue in derivative actions, or
could share that standing with shareholders or other groups.
The various arguments for and against employee primacy will be more or
less salient depending on what form of employee participation one considers. To
focus discussion, most of the time I will focus on a version of employee primacy that
is vigorously opposed to shareholder primacy: election of the board of directors by
all employees of the corporation and only by employees of the corporation, with
employee welfare maximization as the corporation's objective. I will note, however,
Employees also typically know more about what is going on within the corporation that other
groups. See supra section IV. 0
18 As an example, mandatory employee participation in Germany takes both forms.
Under codetermination, employees elect a certain percentage of the supervisory board.
Employees also choose representatives to works councils which help make specified decisions
at lower levels of the business. See infra note 188.
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places in the argument where points raised apply more strongly to less pure variants
of employee primacy. My main focus is on decision-making rather than the objective
function; sometimes I will speak of employee participation, rather than employee
primacy, to emphasize this focus.
As I have noted, the general objective of this paper is to compare employee
primacy with shareholder primacy. However, just as employee primacy comes in
various forms, shareholder primacy looks different in different types of corporations
as well. Indeed, we can classify versions of shareholder control along the same
dimensions as for employee participation:
Shareholders may participate in decisions at different levels of a business.
The basic rule is that shareholders elect the board, must approve specified board-
initiated fundamental changes such as mergers and amendments to the certificate of
incorporation, and may amend the bylaws, whose permitted scope is disputed.19
However, under some circumstances shareholders may be able to take control over
lower-level decisions usually left to the board or officers.
Shareholders may directly participate in a decision or elect representatives
who will act for them -electing representatives is far and away more common.
Which shareholders participate may vary -some shares may be non-voting,
other shares may vote only under specified circumstances, and some shares may
have super-voting rights.
Shareholders may have sole discretion over a particular decision, or may
share decision-making authority with other groups.
Shareholders may have sole standing to share in derivative actions, or could
share standing with employees or other groups.
A key distinction among shareholder-run businesses is between close
corporations and public corporations. In the latter, shares are publicly traded and
there are many shareholders; in the former, there are a small number of shareholders
who are often more actively involved in corporate decision-making, indeed are
themselves often directors and officers. Shareholders thus typically participate
much more actively in close corporations than in public corporations. Moreover,
close corporations are typically much smaller and thus represent much less
concentrated wealth and power. This suggests that civic republicans might look
more favorably upon close corp'rations than public corporations. As I will show,
19 See Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills,
3 BERKELEY Bus. L. J. 205 (2005).
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they would be right to do so. 20 It is also true that some perceived problems with
close corporations might suggest problems with employee primacy.
II. Economics and Civic Republicanism
The methodology of this paper uses arguments from both economics and
from civic republicanism and related philosophical and political movements. This
section lays out some relevant basic background ideas from economics and civic
republicanism. The following sections will then apply those ideas in comparing
employee and shareholder primacy.
The standard law and economics approach to corporate law advocates
shareholder primacy. 21 This is actually somewhat puzzling. After all, a leading
concept in the early application of law and economics to corporate law was the idea
of the corporation as a nexus of contracts. The corporate form is a useful legal fiction
that covers the essentially contractual, market-based interactions between a variety
of different parties: shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and so
on.22 If so, then why do shareholders, among all of these groups, deserve special
20 My focus in this paper is purely on corporations. Considering other forms of
business associations would bring in yet more variety of forms. Thus, some partnerships may
resemble shareholder-run corporations, while others may look more like employee-run
corporations. Even in thinking about corporations, the opposition between shareholder
primacy and employee primacy does not exhaust the possibilities. For instance, Stephen
Bainbridge accepts the shareholder wealth maximization norm but sees ultimate control as
vesting in the board, not shareholders. See Bainbridge, supra note 15. Alternatively, one could
agree with Bainbridge on ultimate board control, but reject shareholder wealth maximization
in favor of either employee wealth maximization or maximizing the combined wealth of a
variety of corporate constituencies -the work of Blair and Stout is at least close to that view.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 14. To keep the tale from becoming too tangled, I will mostly
limit myself to shareholder primacy versus employee primacy in corporations, with occasional
asides on alternatives, mostly in footnotes such as this one.
21 In addition to the sources cited in note 13, see, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS
OF AMERICAN LAW (1993); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1996). The ubiquity of the shareholder wealth
maximization goal in law and economics scholarship also appears in empirical work that uses
changes in shareholder value as the only measure of interest. See Jill E. Fisch, supra note 15. It
is worth noting, though, that while most law and economics scholars endorse a shareholder
primacy norm, many of those same scholars also endorse a strong version of the business
judgment rule, out of a belief that market mechanisms adequately protect shareholders and a
skepticism about the value of judicial intervention. A strong business judgment rule,
however, seriously limits the legal enforceability of a shareholder wealth maximization norm.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 14, at 299-300.
22 The nexus of contracts approach was taken from Michael C. Jensen & William H.
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legal protection? Even if we are focused on maximizing the net social wealth
generated within the typical corporation, it is not obvious that shareholder primacy
achieves that. Most of the debate over shareholder primacy to date focuses on this
question of what legal rules best maximize the net wealth generated for
constituencies clearly within the corporation, and we will consider that debate and
ask what civic republican ideas might add to it.23
But the focus of law and economics on shareholder primacy is puzzling for
broader reasons. Economics need not inevitably confine itself to the net social
wealth generated for one group within a corporation. It takes a complex chain of
reasoning to reach the point of shareholder primacy. Economics is concerned with
maximizing some measure of net social welfare generated for society as a whole,
taking into account the full range of direct and indirect effects of a given set of
policies. In measuring social welfare we may well care about distributive effects -
who gains and losses from a rule. Economists and legal scholars offer some reasons
why we should ignore distributive effects in setting legal rules, but those reasons are
debatable. Even if one ignores distributive effects, corporate law rules could affect
society through many different causal paths. Scholars generally ignore most of these
paths, and focus instead on the direct effect on productive efficiency within the firm.
Even focusing narrowly on production within the firm, shareholder primacy does
not follow - other groups, including employees, are involved within the firm. A
further set of arguments must narrow the focus to the interests of shareholders
alone.24
Each step of the argument for shareholder primacy is eminently contestable,
leading to a variety of reasons to question it. First, one should not concentrate on
"wealth" understood narrowly. Welfare economics focuses on preferences and
welfare, not on narrow financial wealth. Thus, the direct effects of working
conditions and corporate decision-making on employee welfare matter to economic
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN ECON. 305 (1976). For a summary of the application of this approach in legal scholarship,
see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 1-39.
23 See infra part IV.
24 For a similar questioning of shareholder primacy starting with a high level of
generality then narrowing, see KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW:
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006). Dan Farber and I make a similar
point concerning the usual goals of law and economics scholars in the fields of intellectual
property and antitrust in Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness
Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1820-21 (2003).
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analysis of corporations, even if such effects are not easy to measure.25
Second, distributive effects matter within economics. What counts is not
simply maximizing net social welfare, but achieving an acceptable distribution of
well-being.26 Admittedly, most current law and economics scholarship focuses on
efficiency and maximizing total welfare, without reaching the question of
distribution. The leading justification for doing so is that distributive concerns are
best addressed through tax-and-transfer policies, leaving other legal rules (such as
corporate law) to focus only on efficiency. 27 Chris Sanchirico has presented strong
arguments from the theory of the second best and informational economics as to
why achieving redistribution through taxes alone may not in fact be efficient.2a Here,
I will present a different set of reasons, tied to institutional and political feasibility, as
to why we should care about distribution as well as efficiency in setting the rules of
corporate law.29
Third, actions within the corporation may have systemic, general
equilibrium effects outside those groups that are clearly within the corporation, and
corporate law may systematically affect such action. Thus, current scholarship
focuses on partial equilibrium effects, and we need to consider general equilibrium
effects as well. I will consider two kinds of general equilibrium effects. The first is
how corporations affect local public goods and externalities. For instance, a
corporation can affect the community in which it is located through pollution, a
negative externality, or through generating jobs, which has a positive external effect
on economic development. The standard law and economics response to such
effects is that other areas of the law should internalize such externalities.30 However,
the law may not perform this function adequately, and shareholder-run versus
25 See id.
26 One good contribution of Louis KAPLOW AND STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE (2002), is to emphasize this point.
27 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000);
Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing
Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
28 See Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001); Chris William Sanchirico, Exchange: Should Legal Rules be Used to
Redistribute Wealth? Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).
29 See infra part VI.
30 The best know statement of that position is Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (magazine at 33).
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employee-run may differ systematically in the types of externalities they generate in
the absence of adequate external legal controls.31 The internal balance of power
within corporations may also generate powerful external effects via the political
system. Large corporations powerfully influence political lobbying, and hence the
laws that we can expect to see. Economics-influenced scholars have of course
focused much on lobbying in the public choice literature, 32 but have done rather less
to consider the connection between public choice and corporate structure.33
Finally, the nature of corporate decision-making may also affect the human
capital and underlying preferences of participants. Employees who actively engage
in corporate decisions may be better equipped for political action, and may like
political activism more. This effect is a further possible externality effect of corporate
structure. The effect on preferences, however, is a much more non-standard
economic argument than those I have already listed. Standard economic analysis
takes individual preferences as given.34 However, some economists have challenged
the standard analysis, 35 and I will consider what their work has to say about
corporate decision-making as well. 36
I will be comparing and contrasting these ideas drawn from economics with
ideas that emerge from democratic theory, particularly the civic republican tradition
in political history, philosophy, and other disciplines. Civic republicanism covers a
31 See infra part V.
32 Good overviews include DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP F. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE (1991); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003); and Robert P. Inman, Markets,
Governments, and the "New" Political Economy, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 647 (Alan
J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds. 1987).
33 See infra part VI.
34 The best statement of that approach is Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, De
Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977).
35 See ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman
eds., 1998); Brett H. McDonnell, Endogenous Preferences and Welfare Evaluations, in NORMS AND
VALUES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Aristides Hatzis, ed., forthcoming Sept. 2008); George A.
Akerlof & Rachel E. Kramton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q. J. ECON. 715 (2000); Samuel
Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic
Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 75 (1998); Herbert Gintis, Welfare Criteria with Endogenous
Preferences: The Economics of Education, 15 INT'L ECON. REV. 415 (1974); George A. Akerlof &
Rachel E. Kramton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q. J. ECON. 715 (2000), AVNER BEN-NER & LOUIS
PUTITERMAN EDS., ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION (1998); Claire A. Hill, The Law and
Economics of Identity, 32 QUEEN'S L.J. 389 (2007); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977),
http://ssm.com/abstract=844345.
36 See infra part VII.
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wide swathe of ideas and political movements; it means different things to different
people.37 Here, I will give a very brief history of republicanism, intended to
spotlight the ideas within republicanism that interest me and to draw attention to the
political and economic context in which those ideas developed. Republicanism
underwent a brief revival in the law reviews in the eighties; 38 I share many values
with that revival, but will focus less on judges and more on institutions that most
articles in that genre ignore.39
The great philosophical expression of the classical republican ideal began
with Aristotle.40 Aristotle saw the main point of politics as allowing citizens to
develop and express their civic virtue. Humans are fundamentally social, and they
can only truly flourish through exercising civic virtue in their political interactions. 41
The classical notion of republicanism reappeared in renaissance Florence, most
prominently in the work of Machiavelli. 42 Republicanism then made its way to Great
Britain at the time of Cromwell and thereafter. A variety of political writers used
republican rhetoric during the English Civil War, most importantly James
Harrington.43 Of particular note for us is Harrington's stress on the importance of
maintaining rough equality in wealth for achieving republican political equality.
Republican ideas made their way across the Atlantic to the American
colonies, and played an important role during the founding period.44 Much of our
37 The most influential modem historical account of republicanism is J.G.A. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN
TRADITION (2nd ed. 2003).
38 Leading articles in the republican revival included a 1988 Yale Law Review
symposium, including Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) and Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Frank Michelman, Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); and William H. Simon, Social-Republican
Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
39 See Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism,
97 YALE L.J. 1623 (1988).
40 See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Ostwald, trans., Prentice Hall,
1962); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Ernest Baker, trans., Oxford, 1946).
41 For an interesting critique of law and economics as not appreciating the importance
of virtue to human happiness and flourishing, see Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic
Happiness: A Catholic Critique of Law and Economics, 44 J. CATHOLIC LEG. STUD. 35 (2005).
42 See NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES; THE PRINCE. For a lengthy analysis of how
republican ideas functioned within the politics of Florence, see Pocock, supra note 37.
43 See JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWELATH OF OCEANA.
44 The most influential accounts of the role of republican ideas in the Revolutionary
period are GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (new ed. 1998) and
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subsequent history was caught in the tension between Hamilton and Jefferson.
Hamilton set out the path for the tremendous growth in American economic and
political power. Yet, that power has come at the cost of inequality, corruption, and
distorted democracy that Jefferson feared. At various points in our history, as
Hamiltonians have struck out for more power, Jeffersonians have pushed back. As
Stephen Presser has argued, extending limited liability to corporations, and the
move to general incorporation, was meant in good part to encourage the growth of
smaller businesses to act as a counter-weight.45 Unions tried to protect the interests
of employees within the new big businesses. There were sporadic efforts in the
nineteenth and twentieth century to experiment with employee primacy.46 The
antitrust laws also sought to limit the political power of large businesses.47 A variety
of laws aimed at limiting the power of financial capitalists such as bankers and
insurers, including Andrew Jackson's attack on the Bank of the United States, limits
on share ownership by insurers, and the Glass-Steagall Act.48 Both philosophers as
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (enlarged ed. 1992).
A very influential transmitter of republican ideas to the colonists was MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF LAWS (1748).
45 See Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability,
Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 148 (1992); Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, "Single
Business Enterprise," "Alter Ego," and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy and
Shareholder Limited Liability: Back Towards a Unitary "Abuse" Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil,
(Discussion Draft No. 6, 2005), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/docs/presser.pdf.
46 The most successful group of cooperatives in the U.S. appeared in the Pacific
Northwest in the mid-twentieth century in a group of plywood companies. See KATRINA V.
BERMAN, WORKER-OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1967); EDWARD S.
GREENBERG, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION (1986); JOHN
PENCAVEL, WORKER PARTICIPATION: LESSONS FROM THE WORKER CO-OPS OF THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST (2001). The most successful experiments have been in Europe, particularly the
Mondragon system of cooperatives in Spain and the Italian cooperative leagues. On
Mondragon, see GEORGE CHENEY, VALUES AT WORK: EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION MEETS MARKET
PRESSURE AT MONDRAGON (1999); WILLIAM WHYTE & KATHLEEN WHYTE, MAKING MONDRAGON
(2nd ed., rev. 1988); HANS WIENER WITH ROBERT OAKESHOTT, WORKER-OWNERS: MONDRAGON
REVISITED; HENK THOMAS & CHRIS LOGAN, MONDRAGON: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1982). On
the Italian leagues, see PIERO AMMIRATO, LA LEGA: THE MAKING OF A SUCCESSFUL COOPERATIVE
NETWORK (1996); MARK HOLMSTROM, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN ITALY: WORKERS' CO-OPS AND
THE SELF-MANAGEMENT DEBATE (1989). The best economic overview of workers' control may
well be GREGORY K. Dow, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS' CONTROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2003).
47 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 47-51 (2nd ed. 1999).
48 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
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well as political activists have pointed to the tie between economic and political
democracy. 49
Several relevant themes emerge from this historical and philosophical work.
First, active involvement in affairs that affect one's life have a bearing on one's
personal happiness and sense of well-being. Second, limiting inequality in wealth is
important to achieving political equality and real democracy. Third, there may
indeed be such a thing as a public good, understood through a process of political
deliberation. Fourth, political deliberation helps citizens become virtuous and
flourish as social beings. That some famous philosophers made these arguments in
the past does not, of course, make them true. Some of these claims involve empirical
questions, which I will explore below. Others involve normative disputes, which I
will also explore. Note that there is a close relationship between these themes and
the considerations from economics set out earlier. The rest of this paper will develop
these ideas in more detail, and examine what light they shine on the choice between
shareholder primacy and employee primacy.
III. Effects on Intra-corporate Surplus
Most law-and-economics-based corporate law scholarship has focused on
internal efficiency, that is, on generating the largest possible surplus within a
*corporation. By surplus, I mean the net benefits generated for all corporate
constituency groups-it is emphatically not equal to profits, which is just one
component of the corporate surplus. The standard position has been that
shareholder primacy will promote internal efficiency best.50
The preference for shareholders is a bit surprising given the widespread
picture of the corporation as a "nexus of contracts." This picture is drawn from a
highly influential paper by Michael Jensen and William Meckling, and depicts the
49 BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN
LIFE (2008 ed.); G.D.H. COLE, GUILD SOCIALISM RESTATED (New Brunswick 1980); JOHN DEWEY,
INDIVIDUALISM: OLD AND NEW (1930); DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION (1935); AMITAI
ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA
(1993); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY; CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION
AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT; MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996);
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); ROBERT B.
WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1991).
50 For an interesting reflection on some shared interests of managers and labor, see
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests
of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1 (2007).
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corporation as the product of voluntary relationships between many different
groups, including shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers, and customers.51
These relationships are often long-term, so the agreements between the different
groups cannot anticipate all contingencies that will arise during the course of the
relationships. The groups must thus determine who will decide what to do as
various contingencies arise, and on what basis they will make those decisions.5 2 In
large corporations, a managerial hierarchy has emerged, with lower level managers
making more day-to-day, low level decisions and supervising the work of
employees, and higher level managers making more strategic decisions and
supervising the lower level managers. The questions then become, who should have
ultimate control over the managers and in whose interests should the managers be
making their decisions? The conventional answer to both questions under
shareholder primacy is shareholders, but why should the corporation be run only in
their interests, and subject to their ultimate control?
The leading plausible defenses of shareholder primacy are tied to the status
of shareholders as a corporation's residual claimants. Shareholders are entitled to
the stream of profits, or the difference between the revenues the business generates
and the costs it incurs in generating those revenues. This leads to two different
arguments for granting shareholders special status. First, as residual claimants
shareholders are particularly vulnerable and need special legal protection. Second, °
as residual claimants shareholders have incentives to make decisions that maximize
total surplus. Let us consider each argument in a bit more detail.
The first argument asserts that shareholders, as residual claimants, face
severe contracting problems. Every decision within a corporation potentially affects
the residual claimants, because every decision may affect both revenues and costs,
and hence the residual. Trying to specify what managers should do in every
decision through an explicit contract would be prohibitively expensive. Imposing a
fiduciary duty on managers provides a cheaper way than such an explicit contract to
51 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, supra note 22.
52 The transactions cost theory of the firm, growing from the work of Oliver
Williamson, has emphasized the problem of incomplete contracting. See OLIVER WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985).
The property rights theory of the firm, growing from the work of Oliver Hart and
collaborators, has also focused on the problem of incomplete contracting. See OLIVER HART,
FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995).
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require that managers make decisions that do not hurt shareholders. 53 Other
constituencies, including employees (so the argument goes), are concerned about a
more limited number of decisions, and hence can protect themselves more readily
through an explicit contract.
The second argument asserts that residual claimants prefer choices that
maximize the total surplus produced. Given the inability to write complete contracts
telling managers what to do in all situations, we want corporate decision-makers to
use their discretion to make decisions that maximize total surplus. Residual
claimants have the appropriate incentive, since by definition the residual is the
difference between the revenue the corporation generates and the costs it creates.5 4
Others have called these arguments based on the residual claimant status of
employees into question. For one, it is not at all clear that shareholders are the sole
residual claimants in a corporation. Many employees are also residual claimants.
That is clearly true for employees who receive part of their compensation through
profit sharing or stock options. Even for those with set salaries, most employees
have claims against the corporation that become more valuable if the corporation
does well. When the corporation does well, their pensions are safer and their jobs
are more secure, which is particularly important for employees who have invested in
firm-specific human capital.55
It is also not clear that employees can protect themselves contractually more
easily than shareholders. Employees too, as residual claimants, care about a wide
range of decisions within the corporation. Indeed, they probably care more than
non-employee shareholders, as decisions within the corporation affect not only their
expected future financial returns but also their present and future working
conditions. Moreover, insofar as employees have made firm-specific human capital
investments they are particularly vulnerable to decisions that reduce the value of
that investment. 56 Indeed, employees may well be more vulnerable for at least one
53 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMIcs 426-27 (2002);
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 92; Macey, supra note 13, at 36.
54 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 36;.ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
389-90 (1986).
55 See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 305-06(1998); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 907-08 (1993); Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21
STETSON L. REV. 45, 49-53 (1991); Blair & Stout, supra note 14, at 278-79.
56 See Greenfield, supra note 55, at 316; O'Connor, supra note 55, at 916-19.
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key reason: shareholders can diversify their holdings, while employees cannot
diversify their jobs.57 Shareholders also have a variety of other ways to protect
themselves: the market for corporate control, the market for corporate managers,
equity-based compensation of managers, and so on. Indeed, conventional law-and-
economics-based scholars frequently point to precisely those factors in justifying the
weakening of fiduciary duties through the business judgment rule.5 8
Finally, it is also not clear that shareholders always have good incentives to
maximize total surplus. It is well understood, for instance, that since limited liability
forces creditors to bear risk in the event of bankruptcy, shareholders have an
incentive to undertake overly-risky projects, an incentive which worsens as a
corporation nears insolvency.5 9 Given firm-specific investments that have been
made in a corporation, shareholders may well favor corporations taking on more risk
than is socially optimal.60
The argument that employee participation would lead to politicized, costly
decision-making procedures is, I think, the strongest argument against such
participation. Many have made this point, with Henry Hansmann making it in the
most detailed and persuasive treatment.61 Employees differ among themselves more
than shareholders - employees may be new or near retirement, have low or high
skills, be poorly or well paid, have no or significant supervisorial responsibility, and
so on. Shareholders differ too, but not as much -at least in a public corporation,
their main focus will typically be maximizing the share price. Thus, shareholders are
likely to argue less in making decisions, leading to lower decision-making costs.
Hansmann does not argue that employee primacy never makes sense, but rather that
it is most attractive in businesses where labor heterogeneity is less, as well as ones
where the need for outside financing is less. Some firms will find employee primacy
to be the best form of organization; most will not. The market will sort out where
57 The importance of diversification is a key insight of modem finance theory. See
RICHARD A. BREALEY AND STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 153-60 (5th ed.
1996).
58 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 94-97.
59 Courts have recognized this problem, and at a certain point recognize a fiduciary
duty running to creditors along with, or instead of, shareholders. See Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991).
60 See Greenfield, supra note 55, at 308-10.
61 See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996); Hansmann, When
Does Workers Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99




employee primacy makes sense and where it does not.
This argument is powerful, but not decisive. There are several
counterarguments. First, shareholders may differ more than the argument assumes.
Shareholders may intend to hold for a short or long term; they may be individuals,
mutual funds, or union or public pension funds. Complex and extensive modern
derivative markets complicate the interests of equity holders even more.62 Second,
employee primacy may have large benefits, discussed below, that justify its higher
costs. Third, it might be possible to reduce greatly the costs of employee primacy.
Precisely why corporations fail to do just that may be explained in a variety of ways
and, in a later section, I will discuss possible reasons exhibiting network effects why
we observe little employee primacy even if it is more efficient than shareholder
primacy.63
Another potential problem with employee primacy is diversification. If
employee primacy is tied to employee share ownership, then employees may wind
up putting too many eggs in one basket. If their employer fails, not only do they lose
their jobs, but they also lose the value of their shares. This may prevent workers
from joining firms featuring extensive employee ownership and may also make such
firms overly risk averse and less likely to innovate. 64 Of course, this problem can be
avoided if participation is not tied to ownership. Moreover, if it is found desirable
for incentive reasons to tie participation to ownership, then the loss of diversification
may just be part of an inevitable tradeoff -to motivate people one needs to give
them a stake in both the upside and the downside of the business. 65
A further problem with employee primacy is that it makes external equity
financing more costly and difficult to obtain. External investors will be less willing
to invest money in businesses whose boards are elected by its employees than in
otherwise similar businesses whose boards are elected by its shareholders, as the
investors will be concerned about decisions being made against their interests. In a
later section, I will discuss ways that worker-run businesses can ameliorate this
financing problem, but it does remain a cost of doing business. Another problem
62 See Shaun P. Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775.
63 See infra Part VIII.
64 See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Democratic Firm: An Agency-Theoretic
Evaluation, in MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY 13
(Samuel Bowles et al. eds. 1993).
65 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping, 41 REV. ECON.
STUD. 219 (1974).
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worth raising is the dynamic efficiency of employee primacy. Would firms
characterized by employee primacy innovate as much as those characterized by
shareholder primacy? Concern about job redundancy may suggest no. On the other
hand, employees are the source of many new ideas, and might be likely to suggest
more innovations in companies where they are given a greater say and also where
they may fear getting laid off less. I am not aware of systematic evidence on this
question.
A final classic problem worth mentioning is the horizon problem. The claim
is that firms controlled by their employees will under-invest. Investments involve
costs incurred today in the interest of attaining future benefits. Insofar as many
employees may not be with a firm to benefit from increased future revenues, they
will then have less incentive to invest.66 However, this problem is solved if the
employees can sell their membership rights in an employee-run firm. However, for
various reasons these markets might not exist or might not work well. 67 The
problem can also be resolved or reduced by individual capital accounts or by greater
reliance on debt financing.68
It is also worth briefly mentioning here two significant recent approaches
that deny shareholder primacy without embracing employee primacy. Stephen
Bainbridge's model of director primacy rejects shareholder ultimate control while
still accepting shareholder wealth maximization.69  Bainbridge's argument is
complex and nuanced, but to summarize ruthlessly, he focuses on the need to have
some ultimate decision-making authority in a large organization where complete
contracts are impossible. The board fills that role. Bainbridge regularly draws upon
the work of Kenneth Arrow to argue that attempts to make the board more
accountable to shareholders would undermine the board's necessary authority.
70
66 See Eirek G. Furubotn, The Long-run Analysis of the Labor-Managed Firm: An
Alternative Interpretation, 66 AMER. ECON. REV. 104 (1976); Eirek G. Furubotn, Toward a Dynamic
Model of the Yugoslav Firm, 4 CANADIAN J. ECON. 182 (1971); Eirek G. Furubotn & Svetozar
Pejovich, Property Rights and the Behavior of the Firm in a Socialist State: The Example of
Yugoslavia, 30 Zeistschrift fur Nationalokonomie 431 (1970); Svetozar Pejovich, The Firm,
Monetary Policy, and Property Rights in a Planned Economy, 7 WESTERN ECON. J. 193 (1969).
67 See Dow, supra note 46, at 152-61.
68 See id. at 153; Jaroslav Vanek, The Basic Theory of Financing of Participatory Firms, in
THE LABOR-MANAGED ECONOMY: ESSAYS BY JAROSLAV VANEK 171 (1977); David P. Ellerman,
Theory of Legal Structure: Worker Cooperatives, 18 J. ECON. IssuES 861 (1984).
69 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. UNIV. L. REV. 547 (2003); Bainbridge, supra note 53.
70 See Bainbridge, supra note 53, at 198-99; Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 550.
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Thus, he argues for ultimate authority lodged with the board, not shareholders.
However, he accepts the standard arguments for shareholder wealth maximization.7 1
It is interesting that Bainbridge does allow that for some businesses, some forms of
employee participation may be valuable. The types he finds likely to be most
valuable are participation in lower level decisions, rather than company-wide,
strategic decisions at the board level. Employee participation can help deal with
informational and motivational problems that hierarchy can create. 72 Bainbridge
does not believe there is any good reason for government to mandate or encourage
any form of employee participation.
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout in their team production model reject both
principles of shareholder primacy.73 Like Bainbridge they argue for the ultimate
authority of the board, but unlike him they argue that the board's goal should be to
promote the interests of a variety of stakeholders, including both shareholders and
employees. They argue that in public corporations a variety of groups make firm-
specific investments subject to possible exploitation, and each must be induced to
cooperate and not shirk. The board is a "mediating hierarch" that looks out for all
involved groups while punishing all of them if their shirking leads to poor
performance. Note that Blair and Stout limit their theory to public corporations; for
close corporations, they think a shareholder primacy model applies.74
What sort of arguments can we derive from civic republicanism to advance
our thinking about what sort of structure and rules will be efficient (in the sense of
maximizing total corporate surplus, not necessarily maximizing profit) within a
corporation? For one, the observation that employees too are residual claimants,
particularly where they invest in firm-specific human capital,75 fits well with
republican philosophy. Part of that philosophy is a celebration of persons tied to
particular institutions and communities through specific knowledge and
relationships built up over time-which economists inelegantly label firm-specific
human capital. Beyond this, republicanism points to two other arguments for the
internal efficiency of employee primacy: psychic gains to employees, and the
71 See Bainbridge, supra note 53, at 419-29.
72 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21
J. CORP. L. 657 (1996); Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organization
Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979 (1998).
73 See Blair & Stout, supra note 14.
74 See id. at 319.
75 See supra notes 55 through 56 and accompanying text.
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knowledge that employees can bring to bear in decision-making.
A key assumption of republican, and more broadly participatory,
philosophy is that people thrive upon being involved in important decisions that
affect their lives.76 Modem social science supports this insight. Job satisfaction
increases when employees are able to participate in decisions affecting them.77 If
employees feel that decisions are made in a just way, it increases their feelings of
satisfaction and self-esteem.78 In turn, participation in decision-making is one
important way to increase the sense that decisions are made in a just way.79 Even
though the satisfaction from such involvement is non-pecuniary, it counts for an
economic calculus. The economist's notion of efficiency includes as a social gain
anything that individuals feel makes them better off. Psychic gains from
participation, and psychic losses from being cut off from participation, may be hard
to measure quantitatively, but they matter. Nothing in economics denies that. In
calculating the net impact of employee primacy, the increased satisfaction of
employees is an important element that we must put on the plus side of the ledger.
It is true that economics has traditionally been skeptical of psychic gains and
losses that are hard to measure through observable behavior. Recently, however, a
number of economists researching human happiness have become more willing to
consider non-traditional measures, including self-reporting. 80 A robust insight of
this literature has been the large effect of nonfinancial variables on happiness.81
Work time is a large part of the day for most adults; how satisfied they are with that
time will play a large role in their overall life satisfaction.82 In contrast, research
suggests that beyond a certain point overall social increases in wealth (as opposed to
76 See Aristotle, supra note 49; Mill, supra note 49; Pateman, supra note 49; ROBERT A.
DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985).
77 See TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 54-55 (2000); Peter Warr, Well-Being
and the Workplace, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 392 (Daniel
Kahneman et. al. eds. 1999); B.D. Cawley, L.M. Keeping, & P.E. Levy, Participation in the
Performance Appraisal Process and Employee Reactions, 83 J. APP. PSYCH. 615 (1998); A.P. BRIEF,
ATTITUDES IN AND AROUND ORGANIZATIONS (1998); EDWARD LAWLER, HIGH INVOLVEMENT
MANAGEMENT (1986).
78 See Tyler & Blader, supra note 77, at 185-87.
79 See id. at 100-01.
80 See Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from Happiness
Research?, 40 J. ECON. Lrr. 402 (2002).
81 See id. at 403.




individual increases within a society) do not increase overall happiness very much.83
Thus, increasing satisfaction at work may well be valuable even if it has no or
negative effect on productivity. Indeed, a major survey of American employees
done as part of the investigation of the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations 4 found that most American employees want more
involvement in decision-making at work.85
But we may not need to make that tradeoff. Much research suggests that
increased satisfaction at work makes employees more productive.86 Recent empirical
studies on procedural justice suggest that if people feel that decisions affecting them
are made in a just way, they are more likely to abide by those decisions and try to
promote the goals of the organization. Employees who believe their employer is just
will regulate themselves. This allows the organization to reduce costs involved with
monitoring employees, thereby increasing the efficiency of the business.
Involvement in decision-making is one important way of making people believe that
the process is more just and legitimate.87
Another advantage of employee primacy is that employees naturally learn
much about a business simply by doing their jobs. They know much that absentee
shareholders do not know. Moreover, employees are naturally motivated to use that
information to improve how things are going for them- once again, more motivated
than most absentee shareholders who own a diversified portfolio. Thus, if we are
looking for informed and motivated participants to act as a check on managers,
employees are a natural choice. 88 Furthermore, participatory employees may be
83 See id. at 416-18; Richard Easterlin, Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the
Happiness of All?, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 35 (1995); Peter H. Huang, Beyond Cost-Benefit
Analysis in Financial Regulation: Process Concerns and Emotional Impact Analysis, (Temple
University Beasley School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper N. No. 21, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=870453.
84 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FACT-FINDING REPORT: COMMISSION
ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1994).
85 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 16 (1999).
86 See Warr, supra note 77; Michell T. laffaldano & Paul M. Muchinsky, Job Satisfaction
and Job Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 97 PSYCHOL. BULL. 251 (1985).
87 For overviews of this research, see Tom Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence
and Rule Following in Work Settings, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287 (2005); Tyler, Psychological
Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, LEGITIMACY AND
LEGITIMATION xx (2005); Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 117
(2000); Tyler & Blader, supra note 77; Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, Do Workers Enjoy
Procedural Utility?, 49 APP. ECON. Q. 149 (2003).
88 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit Markets and the Control of Capital, 17 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
Spring 2008
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
more motivated to work hard themselves, and to monitor whether or not their fellow
employees are working hard.8 9 On the other hand, botched attempts at participation
can backfire. If employees feel that they are being manipulated and their employer
does not really care about or listen to their input, they can grow resentful.
To be sure, this advantage has its ambiguities. Employees in a large
business may know a great deal about some things, but less about the kind of
financial and strategic issues that occupy much of a board's time. This may argue for
a lower-level and more limited form of employee participation than employee
primacy. Furthermore, the strength of employees' motivation is a mixed blessing.
Insofar as they are motivated to use their knowledge to suggest actions that help the
business generally, everyone benefits. However, insofar as they are motivated to
advocate ideas that benefit them personally at the expense of others, participation
can lead to problems.90 Many of the employees who participate most may turn out
to be cranks -we all know the type.
Nonetheless, a variety of empirical studies do suggest that various forms of
employee participation often lead to improved firm productivity, although the
evidence is ambiguous-it is hard to control for selection effects. 91 This leads to a
question that advocates of employee participation must face: if such participation
does increase the internal efficiency and productivity of businesses, why do we not
see more of it? Shouldn't more productive businesses thrive in a competitive
BANKING 133 (1985); Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Shareholders Should Welcome Knowledge
Workers as Directors (Institute for Empirical Research on Economics, University of Zurich,
Working Paper No. 283, 2006).
89 See Eugene Kandel & Edward P. Lazear, Peer Pressure and Partnerships, 100 J. POL.
ECON. 801 (1992); Bowles & Gintis, supra note 64, at 28. See also supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
90 See Paul R. Milgrom, Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient
Organization Design, 96 J. POL. ECON. 42 (1988); Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining
Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE
POLITICAL ECONOMY (J. Alt. & K. Shepsle eds. 1990).
91 See John P. Bonin et. al., Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Producer Cooperatives:
Will Ever the Twain Meet?, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1290 (1993); ALAN S. BLINDER ED., PAYING FOR
PRODUCTIVITY (1990); Saul Estrin et. al., The Productivity Effects of Worker Participation: Producer
Cooperatives in Western Economies, 11 J. COMP. ECON. 40 (1987); JOHN PENCAVEL, WORKER
PARTICIPATION: LESSONS FROM THE WORKER CO-OPS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 46-52 (2001); but
see R. Oystein Strome, Better Firm Performance with Employees on the Board? Not in the Long Run,
(University College of Ostfold, Paper No. 1757, 2007) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=967445 (finding that Swedish firms with employee board
representation have lower performance in Tobin's Q and return on assets).
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market?92 I defer consideration of that question to a later section.93 Note that even if
employee primacy leads to greater efficiency (in the sense of net benefits generated
for all relevant constituency groups), it need not lead to greater profit, and it may be
that in a capitalist economy markets tend to select more for profitability than
efficiency. One also needs to be careful about what form of employee participation
has the strongest effects. Although I focus for the most part on ultimate control over
the corporation through electing directors, involvement at lower levels, e.g. through
works councils, may make as much, or even more, sense. 94
Note that at least some of the arguments presented here for the internal
efficiency of employee primacy apply more strongly to comparisons with
shareholder primacy in public corporations, as opposed to close corporations and
small businesses. Shareholders in the latter are typically heavily involved in the
business, and thus they realize the psychic gains from participation and have the
information needed to make business decisions. Indeed, insofar as one advocates
employee primacy in the form of employees voting for directors as a way of
reducing the principal-agent problem that boards face, employee primacy is
unnecessary for businesses dominated by one or a few shareholders or owners, as
that problem is not present for such businesses. We will see that this is a recurring
theme -the republican arguments for employee primacy over shareholder primacy
often apply more to a comparison with large, public corporations than with small,
close corporations. On the other hand, the decision-making costs of employee
participation also increase with the number of employees, so the effect of firm size
on the desirability of employee participation is uncertain.
IV. Effects on Others: Corporate Social Responsibility
The previous section focused on the net surplus generated for groups within
the corporation: shareholders, employees, managers, and perhaps creditors.
Decisions made within corporations affect many other persons as well. Corporations
92 This is a core argument for many opponents of employee primacy. See Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-
Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. 469 (1979); Hansmann, supra note 61, at 22;
Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 704-05.
93 See infra part VIII.
94 See WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (JOEL ROGERS & WOLFGANG STREECK, EDS., 1995); Stephen F. Befort, A
New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an American Works Councils Act, 69 Mo. L. Rev. 607
(2004).
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may pollute air and water, give to charities, provide or take crucial jobs from local
communities, aid governments in violating human rights, and so on. Roughly, the
distinction here is between groups that voluntarily choose to deal with the
corporation and those who the corporation affects despite their choices. A vast
literature on the social responsibility of corporations debates whether and to what
extent corporate decision-makers should take into account the interests of such
groups. 95  What, if anything, can civic republicanism and the employee vs.
shareholder primacy question add to this ongoing debate? Republican ideas suggest
that employee primacy or shareholder-run close corporations are likely to result in
corporate decision-makers who are more inclined to take into account such external
effects than are the managers of public corporations run in accordance with the
principles of shareholder primacy.
There are several strong arguments against corporate managers taking into
account goals other than maximizing profits. First, if prices adequately reflect both
the social costs a business generates and the social benefits it creates, then
maximizing profit will maximize net social benefit. Indeed, even if market prices are
not completely right, private bargaining may internalize remaining externalities.96
Second, corporate managers are not necessarily well-placed to determine what is
best for society as a whole.97 Consider, for instance, the managers of Dow Chemical
in a classic shareholder proposal case involving napalm. 98 Shareholders sought to
introduce a shareholder proposal that would recommend that the company stop
selling napalm to customers who planned to use it against humans, a response to the
controversial use of napalm in the Vietnam War. The shareholders alleged that
Dow's managers had stated that in selling napalm to the military they were not
seeking to maximize profit, but rather following a course that they found morally
and politically desirable. How should managers make such choices, in cases where
the morally correct outcome is disputed? Third, in seeking to influence corporate
actions, activists are "seeking to attain by undemocratic procedures what they
95 For a sampling of this literature, see, e.g., three recent symposia: Socio-Economics
and Corporate Law Symposium: The New Corporate Social Responsibility, 76 TuL. L. REV. 1580
(2002); Corporations and the Role of the State, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 523 (2002); Corporate Social
Responsibility: Paradigm or Paradox?, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1282 (1999).
96 This is of course a leading message of Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.
L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
97 See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, THE
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 at 33.
98 See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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cannot attain by democratic procedures." 99
Each of these points has good counterarguments. Prices may not fully
reflect the social costs and benefits of corporate actions. Transaction costs are often
too high for Coasean bargaining to work. Indeed, given these market imperfections,
shareholders, who are also members of the society affected by the social costs of
corporations, might not even want corporations to maximize profits single-
indedly.100 As for managerial decision-making, managers are often better placed
than politicians or agency bureaucrats to know the effects their decisions will have
on the world. Like other members of society, managers have a conscience, and they
can consult it where the moral effects of a decision are debatable.101 Friedman's
prescription that we should seek limits on corporations through politics instead
looks suspect once one realizes that corporations themselves often play a central role
in creating laws, or blocking their creation, and also influence government agencies
in how they enforce laws.10 2
One further important argument for corporate social responsibility relies on
norms. Law and economics traditionally regards the legal system as creating a set of
implicit prices that internalize externalities.10 3 However, enforcement of legal rules
is highly incomplete. Even law and economics scholars have increasingly come to
recognize that we rely upon people following the law because they believe it is the
right thing to do, even if they do not think they will get caught if they break the law.
A highly simplified variant of economics would have managers calculate the
expected costs and benefits of following the law, and choose to break the law when
the expected benefits to shareholders exceed the costs. Given imperfect legal
enforcement, though, we might well prefer that corporate managers follow the same
set of norms that individuals acting outside corporate roles generally do.104
If one accepts the anti-corporate social responsibility arguments, then the
99 Friedman, supra note 97.
100 See Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization and the "Responsible" Shareholder,
10 STAN. J. L. Bus, & FIN. 31 (2005).
101 See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 533 (2006).
102 The next section will focus on these issues.
103 Externalities occur where the actions of one person have un-priced effects on
others. One internalizes an externality by getting the actor to bear the full costs and benefits
her action has on others.
104 See Lee, supra note 101; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005).
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remainder of this section is uninteresting. But suppose that at least some of the
arguments for responsibility are strong enough that corporations should consider
the external effects of their actions. In such a case, the question becomes how the
structure of corporate decision-making affects the likelihood of corporate decision-
makers considering such effects. Are firms subject to employee primacy more likely
to consider external effects than firms that follow shareholder primacy?
Some critics of shareholder primacy argue that the pressure to increase share
price has induced corporate managers to violate laws and norms and impose costs
on society in ways that they would see as unethical acting in their roles as
individuals.10 5 However, even those who believe that shareholder primacy in public
corporations has such consequences disagree on the cure. Some, such as Mitchell,
Elhauge, Blair, and Stout, call for giving managers more discretion. 10 6 They hope
that if managers focus less on pleasing shareholders, they will focus more on
pleasing other groups, including those suffering from corporate pollution and so on.
However, critics fear that if managers focus less on pleasing shareholders they will
focus more on pleasing themselves.
An alternative approach makes corporations more directly accountable to
other constituencies. Corporate constituency statutes in many states already allow
managers to take into account the interests of various groups other than
shareholders or employees. A more muscular version of these statutes would require
managers to take other constituencies into account, and allow members of
constituent groups to sue for violations of fiduciary duty. More modestly, one could
simply require corporations to reveal more information about the social effects of
their actions. 10 7  More ambitiously, one could require boards to include
representatives of different constituencies. 108 I will not consider such approaches
here. 1°9 Considering constituencies other than employees and shareholders would
105 A good sustained argument for the case that shareholder primacy has created
many public bads is LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST
EXPORT (2001).
106 See id.; Blair & Stout, supra note 14; Elhauge, supra note 104.
107 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
108 See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); Alfred F. Conard,
Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941 (1977).
109 For an examination of the choice between employee participation and
constituency statutes, see Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee
Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227 (2005).
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raise a new set of questions and considerations that would further complicate an
already complicated discussion. Moreover, few if any other constituencies have as
strong a stake in a corporation as its employees.
What I will consider is how employee primacy would affect corporate
actions. Is there any reason to think that corporations run in the interests of, and
subject to the ultimate control of, their workers will pollute less, give more to charity,
give to less elitist charities, help out more in the local community, violate human
rights less, and so on? Many, maybe most, such external effects are concentrated in
the local community in which a corporation is located. The corporation's workers
will mostly live in that community as opposed to the shareholders of a public
corporation. The workers are thus more likely to care about the local external effects,
either because they themselves are directly affected, or because they know people
who are, or because they feel social pressure to reduce bad effects on their
neighbors.1 10
Note that this argument for employee primacy also favors close
corporations, whose shareholders also will usually live in the community where the
business is located. However, the argument may favor employee primacy more than
a close corporation. In a close corporation, fewer people will typically have a larger
stake each in the corporation's income than is the case with employee primacy. That
higher stake in the corporation's income gives them incentive to focus more on
increasing the corporation's private return, at the expense of increasing a public
bad."'
Another possible difference is in the effect of governance structure on the
values and norms of corporate managers. As we have seen, some believe that
shareholder primacy in public corporations tends to encourage managers to ignore
norms that they would otherwise try to follow if they were acting on their own
110 Of course, not all external effects are local. For externalities that are felt beyond
the local community where a firm is located, employee primacy would presumably be less
helpful.
111 See John E. Roemer, Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?,
95 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 227 (1993). A complication is that shareholder diversification in
public corporations may actually give public corporation shareholders reason to internalize
external effects insofar as those effects reduce profits in other corporations whose shares they
own, and their shares in any one company's profits are not large. Would this be enough to
counter-balance the benefits discussed in the text from employees considering local external
effects? That is a tough empirical question, but my guess is that more often than not firms
exhibiting employee primacy would internalize externalities better than public corporations
run according to shareholder primacy.
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behalf.112 That might not happen under either employee primacy or within a close
corporation. In these firms, those with ultimate control are actually present at the
point of production. They are less likely to want decisions made on the basis of one
abstract financial principle, maximizing profit, and more likely to take into account
the full range of matters that concern them as human beings.
I think that arguments such as these at least in part underlie longstanding
republican preferences for small-scale local industry. Republicans want decision-
makers to be rooted in the local community so that they are more likely to take the
community's interests into account. Much traditional distrust of big business and
absent owners reflects concerns about what will happen when managers and owners
are not so rooted. The first impulse of most economists is probably to dismiss such
localism, but in a world of imperfect markets and rampant externalities, economists
should recognize that localism has its place.
There is not, to my knowledge, a lot of systematic empirical evidence
currently available on the effects about which this section speculates. There are a
few interesting pieces of evidence, however, such as relatively high social spending
by existing worker cooperatives- the Mondragon cooperatives, for instance, set
aside ten percent of net income for social funds.113 More systematic evidence comes
from a series of empirical sociological studies on the nexus between various
organizational characteristics and pollution rates conducted by Don Grant, Andrew
Jones, and co-authors. These papers do not deal with worker-run firms, but their
evidence is still suggestive. Consistent with the hypotheses of this section, the
studies find that larger firms tend to pollute at a higher rate"1 4 and that firms located
in communities with higher social capital tend to pollute at a lower rate."5 On the
other hand, they also find that firms with shareholders located out-of-state do not
pollute more than firms with in-state shareholders, 116 which goes against the grain of
the analysis here. Indeed, even the shareholding of public corporations is
112 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
113 See Whyte & Whyte, supra note 46, at 42.
114 See Don Sherman Grant II, Albert J. Bergesen, & Andrew W. Jones, Organizational
Size and Pollution: The Case of the U.S. Chemical Industry, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 389 (2002).
115 See Don Grant, Andrew W. Jones, & Mary Nell Trautner, Do Facilities with Distant
Headquarters Pollute More? How Civic Engagement Conditions the Environmental Performance of
Absentee Managed Plants, 83 Soc. FORCES 189 (2004).
116 See Don Grant & Andrew Jones, Do Foreign-Owned Plants Pollute More?: New
Evidence from the U.S. EPA Toxics Release Inventory, 17 Soc'¥ & NAT. RES. 171 (2004).
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disproportionately concentrated with local shareholders,11 7 which could limit the
difference between shareholder-owned public corporations and employee primacy.
I should also mention one other important external effect where employee
primacy seems unlikely to have a positive effect and could have a negative effect.
Firms subject to employee primacy are unlikely to be any less racist or sexist and
more inclusive than shareholder-run firms, and may well do worse on this score.
Employee participation seems likely to more effectively lower decision costs and
thus work better where workforces are relatively homogenous, if one accepts
Hansmann's account of when employee participation works best.118 Employee-run
firms are likely to recognize this, and recruit members who resemble their current
members. This is not by any means certain, and there is an extensive literature on
diversity in decision-making and workforces that has identified a variety of
conflicting effects.119 However, the likely effect of employee participation is to
encourage more homogeneity. Classical versions of civic republicanism have been
accused of racism and sexism, with some justice. 120 There are presumably ways to
limit this tendency, but we should nonetheless acknowledge the problem.'21 No
form of social organization is uniformly superior on all dimensions of evaluation.
Employee primacy would create many benefits, but also some serious costs; this is
one of them.
V. Distribution and Politics
Civic republicans want to reduce economic inequality. Economic inequality
leads to corruption and undue influence for the rich. Civic republicans thus favor
economic systems that do not generate too much inequality. Such suspicion of
concentrated wealth seems a far remove from law and economics. Yet, I will argue
that the republican concern about corruption has a fair amount in common with
public choice theory. Moreover, employee primacy is a powerful response to
117 See Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, The Geography of Investment: Informed
Trading and Asset Prices, 109 J. POL. ECON. 811 (2001); Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz,
Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios, 54 J. FIN. 2045 (1999); Gur
Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment. 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 659 (2001).
118 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
119 See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical
Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1795-1802 (2003).
120 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1988).
121 This is another question that deserves further exploration, and I hope to do so in
future work.
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concerns about unequal wealth and power. Employee primacy could generate
greater equality directly through within-firm salaries, reduce distorting corporate
political influence, and limit the ability of managers to use corporate funds to
achieve personal and class ends through politics.
The first question to ask is whether there is any systematic difference
between employee primacy and shareholder primacy in generating inequality. The
answer seems to be yes, although it depends in part on the type of employee
primacy one considers. American corporations guided by shareholder primacy
generate substantial inequality of both wealth and income. Although many
Americans do own shares, directly or indirectly, share ownership is still highly
unequal, and an important source of differences in wealth. Moreover, American
public corporations generate great wage inequality. Most notorious is the huge
growth in compensation of CEOs and other top executives relative to what ordinary
workers receive. 122 More generally, there seems to be a growing division between
skilled professionals and less skilled workers.
Firms subject to employee primacy seem to generate less inequality, for
several reasons. First, residuals are distributed to workers, not shareholders.
Second, wage differentials typically are narrower in worker-owned firms than in
their shareholder-owned counterparts. 123 Moreover, as the next section will argue,
more widespread employee primacy could affect social norms, leading more people
to prefer more egalitarian outcomes.
Even granted that employee primacy tends to generate greater equality in
wealth and income, the question remains whether this is a good reason for legally
favoring employee primacy. One could simply deny that greater equality of wealth
or income is an attractive goal. However, accepting economics as a useful tool
122 See LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
123 See Dow, supra note 46, at 25; Ben Craig & John Pencavel, Participation and
Productivity: A Comparison of Worker Cooperatives and Conventional Firms in the Plywood Industry,
in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTIvrrY: MICROECONOMICS (Martin Neil Baily et al., eds.
1995) 121, 133 (Northwestern plywood coops); Cheney, supra note 46, at 48-49 (Mondragon);
Will Bartlett et al., Labor-managed Cooperatives and Private Firms in North Central Italy: An
Empirical Comparison, 46 IND. & LABOR RELATIONS REv. 103 (1992) (Italian coops). A selection
effect probably explains some of this difference: in an economy where few businesses engage
in employee primacy, workers with a preference for egalitarianism are disproportionately
drawn to such businesses. If employee primacy became more widespread, the differences
between shareholder-run and employee-run firms might narrow. However, it appears
unlikely they would disappear completely.
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certainly does not entail accepting that position. I will not engage in the
fundamental philosophical debate as to the attractiveness of a more egalitarian
distribution of resources, but will simply assume that achieving somewhat more
equality than the U.S. currently experiences is a worthy goal.124
Even some who support employee primacy and favor a more egalitarian
distribution of income do not think that achieving great equality is a good argument
for employee primacy. 125 There are other ways to redistribute wealth and income,
especially tax-and-transfer policy (i.e., taxing the rich and giving subsidies to the
poor). Economists have long argued that tax-and-transfer policies are the best way
to redistribute wealth. The second fundamental welfare theorem is the classic
statement of that position. 126 More recently, Kaplow and Shavell have provided a
formal argument for using only tax policy to redistribute wealth even in a second-
best world where many of the perfect-market assumptions of the second welfare
theorem do not hold. 127 However, Chris Sanchirico has shown that this argument is
not necessarily a plausible application of the theory of the second best.1 28
I want to consider a somewhat different sort of response to the Kaplow and
Shavell argument. The structure of corporations may have a powerful effect on
lobbying, and hence on legislation. Thus, we may want the law to encourage certain
corporate structures over others, e.g. employee primacy over shareholder primacy,
because otherwise the sorts of redistribution we would like to achieve may not be
politically feasible.129
We can make this argument using public choice and the theory of the firm.
Public choice sees politics as a competition among different interest groups. 30 Who
124 The gold-standard modem argument for a more egalitarian distribution is of
course JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Even if one accepts the argument for a more
egalitarian distribution, there is a very tricky question as to what we should be distributing. Is
it welfare (Harsanyi, Kaplow & Shavell), primary goods (Rawls), capabilities (Sen), some
measure of resources (Dworkin) or what? For now, let me note that on most plausible
theories, wealth and income are either a part of the measure of what we should be
distributing, or at least a somewhat useful proxy for whatever it is we should be distributing.
125 See Dow, supra note 46, at 26.
126 See HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 200-02 (2nd ed. 1984).
127 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 27.
128 See Sanchirico, supra note 28.
129 For a version of this argument, see Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law
and Economics Movement, 84 GEORGETOWN L.J. 2071 (1996); see also Reza Dibadj, Weasel Numbers,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1325, 1382-84 (2006).
130 See, e.g., Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
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will do better in this competition depends in part on who finds it easier to organize
effectively. One key branch of public choice theory has posited that smaller groups
whose members get more concentrated benefits and costs from legislation are more
likely to be able to organize than more diffuse groups whose members have less at
stake individually.1 31
The modern public corporation has led to a smaller number of larger
corporations than in the traditional economists' model of atomistic competition.
Standard public choice (Mancur Olson version) suggests that fewer, but larger,
businesses will find it easier to work together to lobby legislatures. 132 Moreover,
managers of such corporations often have much cash on hand to finance such
lobbying. The theory of the firm suggests that to the extent that corporate structure
does not fully constrain such managers, 133 they might use it to advance agendas that
benefit them. 34 As a result, legislation is likely to go too far in benefiting large
corporations and their managers. 135
What could employee primacy do to limit this problem? For one, to the
extent that such organization helps limit undue managerial discretion,136 it could
limit the misuse of corporate funds to lobby for measures that benefit managers
personally and as a class. Also, firms subject to employee primacy will typically
tend to be smaller than shareholder-owned firms, 137 leading to more dispersed
industrial structure in which political organizing should be harder. Employee
primacy may enable groups representing employees to organize more effectively
19 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FORMULATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962). For good overviews of public
choice theory, see the references in note 32.
131 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). I read once, I wish I could remember where, that this book would
have been better named The Illogic of Collective Action or The Logic of Collective Inaction.
132 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. REV. 1103 (2002).
133 See supra section IV.
134 See Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE. L.J. 235 (1981).
135 Jurisdictional competition for incorporations arguably exacerbates this tendency.
See Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 99 (2004).
136 See supra section IV.
137 See Dow, supra note 46, at 142-64. The idea intuitively is that employee-run firms
will be more reluctant to add new employees in good times because they must share profits
with the new employees.
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and thereby present a countervailing power to political groups that represent the
interests of managers, shareholders, or small businesspeople. Of course, sometimes
employees and their representatives will pursue selfish aims contrary to the public
interest. Still, by equalizing the political playing field, this could lead to legislation
that is more likely to reflect the interests of a range of groups, and more likely to
attempt to redistribute income away from the wealthy. 138
Before moving on, I should address at least one important response. If laws
affecting corporate organization do indeed affect political organization, then those in
charge of large public corporations, and their political minions, should realize that,
and hence oppose legal changes that are likely to undermine their power. Thus,
although it may have made sense for small businesses, employees, and the like to
enact laws in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that limited the growth
of large public corporations, those opponents of big business lost. Legal reforms
today to endorse employee primacy are unlikely to succeed if they pose a threat to
the managers of large public corporations. 39
This is a powerful objection, and, indeed, I am not optimistic about the
prospects for significantly expanded employee primacy, or even lesser forms of
employee participation, in the U.S. But dim hope does not imply no hope at all.
First, some growth can occur within the private sector even given existing law. If
that happens, it could provide a political base for more supportive law, which could
spur further growth, and so on in a virtuous cycle. Second, some political
institutions within the complex system of American governance may be more open
to change than others. Some state legislatures may be willing to pursue reforms.
Some courts may be more resistant to political pressure, and judges on some issues
may be willing to interpret laws in ways that favor employees. Some executive
agencies, for instance the National Labor Relations Board under a Democratic
president, may be more open to pressure from employee advocates. Voters may be
more willing to accept some sorts of reforms than explicit redistribution through the
tax and welfare system.140 These institutional differences can be strong reasons for
138 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952) on the concept of countervailing power.
139 This resembles one part of Kaplow & Shavell's brief response to the political
feasibility objection to their argument for using only tax policy to redistribute. See Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 27, at 675.
140 See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of
Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (2005).
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pursuing laws that we can achieve through more friendly institutions rather than
following possibly more efficient tax laws that must pass through a currently quite
unfriendly Congress. Of course, should employees succeed in obtaining more
political power, the result will not be unmitigatedly good -like any other group,
employees will sometimes use political power to achieve ends that benefit
themselves but not society as a whole. But overall the effect of having the less
economically well-off better represented than they are now seems likely to be
positive.
VI. Values and Endogenous Preferences
Civic republicans see a close tie between virtuous citizens and effective
political deliberation. Each helps produce the other. Virtuous citizens do not simply
pursue their own self-interest through politics, but rather deliberate together to try to
understand and bring about a common good. This process of collective deliberation
in turn helps individual citizens realize and perfect their nature as political and
reasoning beings.141  Civic republicans fear corruption for its effect on both
individuals and the democratic process. The fear of financial capitalism and
concentrated wealth derives in large part from a fear of their corrupting effect on
individual virtue.142
In the modem legal literature on republicanism, this has translated into a
focus on ways in which individual preferences are endogenous to the political
process. 143 It is thus no surprise that Cass Sunstein was a leader in the republican
revival, as Sunstein has concerned himself with endogenous preferences in much of
his work.'" The law review civic republicans focused mainly on how courts, and to
a lesser degree legislatures, influence social norms. They focused less on the role of
economic interactions in shaping individual norms, although the occasional writer
did argue that the new republicans should think more about such things.145
141 A wide variety of philosophers and political thinkers have made similar points for
millennia. See Aristotle, supra note 40; Machiavelli, supra note 42; Rousseau, supra note 49;
Dewey, supra note 49; HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963).
142 See Pocock, supra note 37; Wood, supra note 44.
143 See Sunstein, supra note 38.
144 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000); FREE MARKETS
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999); How Law Constructs Preferences, 86 GEO. L. J. 2637 (1998); Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
145 Brest criticized the republican revival along these grounds. See Brest, supra note
39. An excellent effort to apply civic republican ideas to economic institutions is William H.
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In thinking about the interaction between corporations, the law, and
individual preferences and norms, we are moving further away from mainstream
economic thought. Economists typically treat individual preferences as fixed. 146 The
growth of behavioral economics and behavioral law and economics has changed that
somewhat in recent years. Behavioralists have questioned some of the traditional
rationality assumptions economists make by drawing on the work of cognitive
psychologists. They see preferences as more unstable and context-dependent than
the traditional economic approach. 47
The hope is that employee primacy can create both skills and values that
support greater democracy in the political world. A variety of philosophers and
economists have rested their case for employee participation in part on this hope.148
Much empirical work suggests that various forms of employee participation do
make workers happier with their jobs, with the effect stronger for forms focused on
the immediate work environment. 49 Whether that translates into more, and more
effective, involvement in political life is less clear. Some researchers have found little
connection 50 A possible explanation for little connection (or even a negative
connection) is that participation in the workplace substitutes for participation in
politics, both as a source of satisfaction and also as a drain on time. Still, more
Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1335 (1991).
146 For a leading and influential statement of this approach, see GARY BECKER,
INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR; George J. Stigler & Gary S.
Becker, De Gustibus Non est Disputandum, 67 AMER. ECON. REV. 76 (1977).
147 See McDonnell, supra note 35. For overviews of behavioral law and economics, see
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
15 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000). For a
reflection on the role of norms in the theory of the firm, see Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm,
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459 (2005).
148 See, e.g., Pateman, supra note 49; Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Democratic
Firm: An Agency-Theoretic Evaluation, in MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATION,
ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY (Samuel Bowles et. al. eds., 1993); Bowles & Gintis, The
Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy, 7 J. ECON.
PERSP. 83 (1993); BOWLES & GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: PROPERTY, COMMUNITY, AND
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1986); RONALD M. MASON, PARTICIPATORY
AND WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY: A THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM
(1982).
149 For an overview of this research, see JOHN L. CoTrON, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT
(1993); see also supra notes 77 and 85 and accompanying text.
150 See E. GREENBERG, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF
PARTICIPATION (1986).
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researchers have found a positive correlation between workplace participation and
political participation.151 Of course, a correlation does not prove causation-perhaps
certain people like democratic decision-making, and hence are drawn to both politics
and worker-controlled businesses. At least one study, though, controlled rather
effectively for this by studying the effects of exogenous changes in job structure, and
found that such changes changed the leisure and political behavior of workers. 5 2 It
does seem at least plausible, if currently not fully proven, that effective participation
within the workplace will make people both better able to engage in group decision-
making and also more interested in doing so.
Insofar as democratic participation within the firm increases skills that also
help for democratic participation in politics, we can easily understand the possible
normative implications. Such skills clearly help both the individual workers and
those who interact with them. Thus, within-the-firm participation may generate a
positive externality, and we know that such externalities tend to be under-produced.
That does not yet necessarily entail that governmental intervention is required -we
must look closer before reaching that conclusion.153  We can see a possible
inefficiency of the private sector here, however, because it will produce too few
people with strong skills supporting democratic involvement, since a firm does not
have incentive to consider the positive effects workers with democratic skills have on
the political system.
Changed preferences present a similar externality-if employees from a
participatory business go out and participate more in political life, that benefits other
citizens.'5 Of course, sometimes those employees will pursue goals that hurt some
others, or even society generally. Still, insofar as one believes that on balance
democratic participation in decision-making is a good thing, then social institutions
that increase such participation create a net public good. However, changed
151 See Melvin L. Kohn, Unresolved Issues in the Relationship Between Work and
Personality, in THE NATURE OF WORK: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 154 (Kai Erikson & Steven
Peter Vallas eds. 1990); MELVIN L. KOHN & CARMI SCHOOLER, WORK AND PERSONALITY: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION (1983); Stephen C. Smith, Political Behavior
as an Economic Externality, in ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATORY AND
LABOR-MANAGED FIRMS: A RESEARCH MANUAL (Derek C. Jones Jan Svejnar eds., 1985) 123.
152 See Robert Karasek, Job Socialization: A Longitudinal Study of Work, Political and
Leisure Activity, reported in Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences
of Markets and other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 75, 99 (1998).
153 Section VIII will explore this point further.
154 See Bowles, supra note 152, at 105.
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preferences and values present a harder problem than increased skills. How are we
supposed to evaluate the states of affairs: using the values workers have without
employee participation, or those they would have if they did engage in such
participation? One useful effect of the standard assumption of fixed preferences is
that it allows us to avoid this awkward question. But those who deny the
assumption must face up to the question. 155
Recent work in economics on norms and organizations is of some help.15 6
Trust is a norm that is of value in both workplaces and the political sphere. 157 If
employees who are engaged in joint production trust their fellow employees and
their employer, they will be willing to work harder, and all will then benefit from the
resulting increased output. 5 8 Similarly, trust between citizens and political leaders
will allow political systems to give leaders greater discretion to come up with good
outcomes. 15 9 Trust, in turn, is more likely if people believe that others are likely to be
trustworthy. 160 Working closely with fellow employees and managers in making
155 See McDonnell, supra note 35.
156 For a collection of articles that both provides a good overview and helps to
advance this area of research, see AVNER BEN-NER & Louis PUTTERMAN, EDS., ECONOMICS,
VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION (1998). See also Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game
Theory and Economics, 83 AMER. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993); George Akerlof, Labor Contracts as
Partial Gift Exchange, 90 Q. J. ECON. 749 (1982).
157 Although in some circumstances trust may not be socially desirable. See Claire A.
Hill & Erin A. O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=869423. Indeed, even within the workplace, insofar as building in-
group trust may lead to discrimination against socially marginalized groups it can be
problematic. See supra notes 118 through 121 and accompanying text; Frank B. Cross, Law and
Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457 (2005).
158 See Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Values and Institutions in Economic Analysis,
in Ben-Ner & Putterman in in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION (AVNER BEN-NER &
LOUIS PUTTERMAN, EDS., 1998); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, How Effective Are Trust- and
Reciprocity-Based Incentives?, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION (AVNER BEN-NER &
LOUIS PUTTERMAN, EDS., 1998); Andrew Schotter, Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the
Performance of Work Groups, in in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION (AVNER BEN-NER &
LOUIS PUTrERMAN, EDS., 1998); Jonathan Baron, Trusts: Beliefs and Morality, in in ECONOMICS,
VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION (AVNER BEN-NER & LOUIS PUTITERMAN, EDS., 1998).
159 See Jonathan Baron, Trusts: Beliefs and Morality, in in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND
ORGANIZATION (AVNER BEN-NER & LOUIS PUTITERMAN, EDS., 1998).
160 See Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Values and Institutions in Economic Analysis,
in Ben-Ner & Putterman in in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION (AVNER BEN-NER &
LOUIS PUTTERMAN, EDS., 1998); Andrew Schotter, Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the
Performance of Work Groups, in in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION (AVNER BEN-NER &
LOUIS PUTERMAN, EDS., 1998).
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decisions may allow employees to build more trust.161  Insofar as this trust
generalizes from the workplace into the political realm, it could improve political
decision-making. 162
However, evaluating the value of workplace participation must go beyond
the goal of building trust. For further guidance on the complications of evaluation
given endogenous preferences, economists need to look to other disciplines.
Psychology and sociology can tell us more about the dynamics of how social norms
are created and changed. History can tell us about how we developed our current
values, and reveal other possibilities. Political philosophy can help evaluate our
current state.
The work of Jurgen Habermas illustrates the potential utility of political
philosophy in this context. Habermas focuses our attention on how people come to
develop their beliefs and values through interaction with others in social institutions.
In talking and acting within groups, we must make assertions and back them up
with reasons. Through the back and forth of argumentation, subjecting our beliefs to
criticism from others, we can improve our beliefs and values.163
Habermas's approach is clearly related to republicanism, especially the
modern law professor's variant with its emphasis on deliberation, although his goals
are to some degree different. 64 A big part of Habermas's project is to reconstruct
philosophical understandings of truth and rationality, concerns that are rather
distantly removed from mine here. However, Habermas also develops his critical
theory as a basis for suggesting reforms in modern society that fit pretty well with
the practical suggestions of republicanism and this paper.165 It clearly gives some
reason for endorsing employee primacy. Workers actively involved in making work
decisions within a group are engaged in the very sort of process through which we
161 See supra notes 87 and 158.
162 See Baron, supra note 159.
163 The leading formulation of his thought is JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOL. 1: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (1981) and
JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION,VOL. 2: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A
CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (1985).
164 See the references in note 38. Other philosophers who could be used to similar
effect include Dewey, Arendt, and perhaps even Rawls. On Dewey and economic democracy,
see Westbrook, supra note 49; on Arendt, see supra note 141; on Rawls, see JOHN RAwLs,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 216-20 (1993); RAwLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 198-202
(2001).
165 See Thomas McCarthy, Translator's Introduction, in HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION VOL. 1 (1985).
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expect to see truth emerge, following a Habermasian approach. 166
The contemporary law scholars' revival of republicanism has focused
heavily on deliberation and the development of moral values. However, it has
mostly done so in a rather elitist way. The spotlight is on deliberation in courts and
legislatures, and how the legal rules those political elites devise affect the values of
ordinary folk. The ordinary folk do not play a very large role in the main action.
Employee primacy provides a much more direct, important, and intimate role for
everyday people in the crucial process of deliberation that molds moral values.
Note that we must be careful about what kind of employee participation the
arguments of this section tend to favor. The arguments most strongly favor more
direct forms of participation at lower levels, where employees can actively engage
with co-workers and managers on a daily basis. However, election of board
representatives may have some value as well in preparing for political participation;
indeed, such participation more closely resembles most political participation.
I should also note a problem with employee participation, one that we have
already encountered in another guise or two.167 Employee participation might be
more effective within more homogenous groups of employees, and we might expect
participatory businesses to be relatively homogenous. If so, though, it is not clear
that the trust generated within such a closed in-group will generalize to participation
in the more diverse setting of political life. Indeed, it could help generate conflict
between conflicting groups within a polity. This is another variant of the frequent
objection to republicanism as breeding ethnocentrism, and we cannot easily dismiss
it. As I have already said,168 no form of social organization comes without costs. As
we continue to explore the relative costs and benefits of employee primacy, this
tendency towards homogenization is an important cost we will have to weigh in the
balance.
Still, on the whole we have seen many great benefits available from
employee primacy. It tends to generate more well-being within corporations,
generate fewer negative externalities outside of them, foster a more egalitarian
166 Will this lead to too many meetings? Am I just an intellectual over-valuing
activities in which I have a comparative advantage? These are good questions. Answering
them would take us too far afield in an already rather sprawling article. I point out that at
least I am in good company; the approach to political and social life I advocate here has an old
and distinguished pedigree.
167 See supra notes 118 through 121 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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economic and political system, and nurture democratic values.
VII. Why So Little Employee Primacy?
That's all very fine and well, but if employee primacy is so great, then why
do we see so little of it? Opponents would argue that the arguments canvassed here
favoring employee primacy are not that strong, and the problems with employee
primacy make it impractical for most businesses. The infrequency of firms featuring
employee primacy shows that employee primacy does not work well for most
businesses. Is that correct?
A full-fledged response goes beyond the scope of this paper, but I owe at
least an outline of an answer. We must break down the above arguments for
employee primacy into two categories. The first category draws upon the arguments
raised in section III, focused on intra-corporate surplus. If employee primacy does
indeed generate a higher net surplus than shareholder primacy, then the question
becomes why businesses do not adopt it. It should be possible to pay each
constituent group in the corporation as much as or more than they receive in
conventional corporations, so that each group should be willing to make the switch.
Why does that not happen? The second category addresses the arguments raised in
sections IV through VI. All of these arguments concern various types of externalities
that in part affect groups outside of the corporation. For these, economics suggests
much less evolutionary pressure in favor of an efficient outcome. However, we must
consider whether these arguments are plausibly strong enough to worry about, and
if so, whether any sort of governmental intervention will improve things. We must
also worry about the political feasibility of any proposed intervention.
Consider first the question of intra-corporate surplus. Skeptics of employee
primacy have long pointed to its relative rarity as evidence that it does not work as
well as conventional models of corporate governance.1 69  What might stop
companies from adopting employee primacy despite its relative efficiency? One
possibility is that the law may inhibit some forms of employee participation in
employee decision-making. A leading possible suspect is section 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act, under which it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor




organization or contribute financial or other support to it."170 Section 2(5) of the Act
defines a labor organization as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work."171 Although this presumably does not affect employee election
of directors, it does, as interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board and
courts, 72 seem to call into question many forms of employee participation, such as
works councils. 173
Supporters of employee primacy have noted a variety of other possible
factors that impede the growth of employee participation in corporate decision-
making.174 Outside financing may be harder to obtain. This could be due to the
sheer unfamiliarity of worker control,1 75 or because providers of outside financing
fear that worker-controlled firms will be harder to discipline. However, the
development of altenrative, more sympathetic capital-providing institutions would
certainly help the success of worker-controlled firms. A leading example is the
Mondragon complex of cooperatives, where a bank, the Caja Laboral Popular, is at
the center of the complex. 7 6 Other financial innovations that could encourage
employee primacy include developing something like preferred shares shaped to the
needs of employee-owned businesses, developing and improving systems of
employee contributions and accounts similar to those in Mondragon, and
developing a system of cross-holding among employee-run businesses, similar to
what we see among Japanese firms. This latter could also help reduce the
170 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2007).
171 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2007).
172 See, e.g., Elctromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir.
1994).
173 See Befort, supra note 94; Bruce E. Kaufman, The Employee
Participation/Representation Gap: An Assessment and Proposed Solution, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
491 (2001); Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition: The
Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1994); Charles B.
Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34
ARIZ. L. REV. 397 (1992).
174 See, e.g., Dow, supra note 46; Bonin et. al., supra note 91; Bowles & Gintis, supra note
64.
175 BRETT H. McDONNELL, LABOR-MANAGED FIRMS AND BANKS (1985) (unpublished,
Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with Stanford University Library)..
176 See supra note 46.
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diversification problem.177
Also, as noted above, workers may face higher decision-making costs than
shareholders because of the greater heterogeneity in their preferences as to what the
business should do.178 However, skilled managers and skilled workers could lower
those costs, e.g., by running meetings more smoothly or communicating with one
another in more efficient and less conflictual ways. Additionally, skilled managers
and workers will be available in greater numbers in economies that have many
worker-controlled firms. Schools at various levels, from elementary to business
school, will reflect the prevailing model of social organization and help train future
workers and managers with the skills that fit that prevailing model.179
Considering another factor, several analysts have noted that worker
cooperatives would do better if there were a developed market for membership, that
is, a market where persons could buy membership in such cooperatives. 18° These
markets might develop and work better if there were a large number of cooperatives.
As a final factor for now, and one of particular interest to lawyers, employee primacy
would be more likely to flourish if there were a well-developed body of law to help
define rights and responsibilities within such firms under various circumstances. 181
Legislators and courts are unlikely to develop such law, though, in the absence of
worker-controlled firms.
Each of these explanations for the dearth of worker-controlled firms has the
following structure. Firms featuring employee primacy would generate a greater
internal surplus in the presence of some factor -favorable financial institutions,
managers and workers skilled at democratic decision-making, membership markets,
laws, and so on. That factor, however, is likely to develop only if many firms
featuring employee primacy are present. The lack of such firms keeps the factor
177 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Of course, Japan is not the exemplar that
it seemed several decades ago. For some thoughts on the U.S./Japan comparison, see Brett H.
McDonnell, Convergence in Corporate Governance -Possible, But Not Desirable, 47 VILL. L. Rev.
341 (2002).
178 See supra notes 61 through 63 and accompanying text.
179 See SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA:
EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1977).
180 See Dow, supra note 46, at 148-56.
181 See David Ellerman & Peter Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New Worker
Cooperative Statute in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 441 (1982-83). On
possible network effects and path dependence in the development of legal rules, see Michael
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995); Mark
J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996).
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from developing, which in turn keeps firms featuring employee primacy from
developing, and so on in a vicious cycle. These arguments all feature types of
network externalities -a particular product, or standard, or way of doing things, is
more productive the more widely it is used. Markets featuring network externalities
typically exhibit multiple possible equilibria. One equilibrium may be Pareto-
preferred to another, and yet the inferior equilibrium may prevail. Once one is stuck
in an inferior equilibrium, there may be little or no impetus to move to a better
outcome. Government intervention potentially can help such a system move to a
better equilibrium. 82 Of course, innovation does happen despite such obstacles.
However, the fact that some desirable innovations do occur does not imply that all
good innovations will occur, and the more radical the change from existing
institutions, the more strongly will such effects block innovation.
These network externality stories do not supplant existing explanations for
the patterns of employee primacy that we observe, but rather they supplement them.
Consider, for instance, the important work of Henry Hansmann and Stephen
Bainbridge. Both scholars grant that in certain circumstances, some forms of
employee participation can have positive effects of the sort discussed in section I1.
However, employee participation also has costs, particularly in politicized and thus
expensive decision-making due to the greater heterogeneity of workers than
shareholders. Thus, the theories of Hansmann and Bainbridge suggest that some but
not all businesses will choose to involve employees in decision-making, with the
relative heterogeneity of employees compared with shareholders as a key variable
affecting the prospects of employee participation. 8 3
The network externality story suggests that the relative advantage of
employee involvement in decision-making will vary depending on how many other
businesses have a similar form of involvement. Although it will always be true that
employee involvement will be more attractive in businesses with more homogenous
employees, in economies with a high degree of employee involvement, a higher
proportion of businesses will find such involvement to be worth doing. Depending
182 See, e.g, W. Brian Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics, in THE ECONOMY
AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM 9 (Philip W. Anderson et. al. eds., 1988); Paul A. David, Clio
and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985); Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998); but c.f. S.J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
205 (1995).
183 See Hansmann, supra note 61, and Bainbridge, supra note 53.
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on the exact nature of the relationship between net benefits in individual businesses
and the economy-wide level of employee involvement, this may lead to multiple
possible equilibrium levels of the proportion of businesses that choose to involve
employees in decision-making.
A closely related argument for why firms subject to employee control might
generate a greater intra-corporate surplus and yet not flourish in the market place
comes from some work by Gregory Dow.184 Dow shows how firms with employee
control may be more efficient, but their current members do not capture the full
surplus that they generate because some of them will leave the firm before all future
benefits generated by current investments are achieved. This leads to a tendency to
invest at a lower rate than shareholder firms, leading the latter to dominate in the
market. Of course, if investment is too low, the employee-run firms will be less
efficient, but Dow shows that there can be an intermediate realm where employee-
run firms grow more slowly than shareholder-run firms and yet are more efficient.
Dow argues that perfectly functioning markets for membership in employee-run
firms would eliminate this problem, but that in the real world membership markets
are likely to be imperfect at best.
Consider now the arguments in sections IV through VI. All of these concern
externalities that in part affect groups outside of the corporation. Pollution affects
those who live near the polluting plant. Political lobbying leads to laws that affect
everyone in a jurisdiction. Changed values and preferences of workers affects others
in a community when those workers move to other businesses, interact with others
in the community, particularly in local politics, or when they pass their values on to
their children. Wherever significant externalities exist, markets may not lead to
efficient outcomes. Of course, markets may work despite externalities- that is the
point of the Coase theorem.185 However, where transaction costs are high enough,
market outcomes will generally not be efficient.
Inefficiency does not, however, automatically justify government
intervention. First, if one believes that the effects described in sections IV through VI
exist, they may not be great enough to notice. Is that so here? It is hard to say, in the
absence of economies with large number of firms featuring employee primacy. 186
184 See Dow, supra note 46; Gregory K. Dow, Democracy Versus Appropriability: Can
Labor-managed Firms Flourish in a Capitalist World?, in MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY:
PARTICIPATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY 176 (Samuel Bowles et. al. eds. 1993).
185 See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
186 One example of a large economy that does feature a significant amount of
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Externalities such as pollution are certainly important, but would employee-
controlled corporations pollute noticeably less than corporations run according to
shareholder primacy? Corporate lobbying certainly has major effects on our laws,
which in turn have major effects on our economy and society, but how different
would corporate lobbying be under employee primacy? Values favoring democratic
participation could certainly boost political democracy, but how much would
employee primacy actually affect political action? We have bits and pieces of
evidence, discussed in the relevant sections above, but it is hard to reach systematic
conclusions on any of these topics. Still, the arguments laid out here are significant
enough that employee primacy could have a quite notable positive impact outside of
the corporation itself.
Even so, we have not yet justified any and all interventions in favor of
employee participation. Even if there are notable benefits, we must trade these off
against the costs, and determine how well any particular suggested intervention
would do at achieving as much benefit as possible at the lowest feasible cost. These
are obviously very hard to estimate. I next turn to the question of suggesting and
justifying legal interventions to encourage employee participation.
VIII. Possible Interventions
The previous section laid out a variety of reasons why markets might not
produce the best possible number of corporations adopting employee participation
in its various guises. We might be better off with more employee participation than
the market produces when left to its own devices. This suggests that we might
improve society by intervening legally to promote employee primacy. Nevertheless,
we must be careful in moving from the theoretical possibility of improvement to
actual interventions. The gains from greater participation may turn out to be small,
and the costs great. I will thus suggest interventions that are modest, flexible, and
reversible.
What, then, might we do to help encourage employee participation? I will
focus here on participation at the level of selecting board representatives. 8 7 One
employee participation through the system of co-determination is Germany. For some of my
thoughts on the comparison between German and American corporate governance, see Brett
H. McDonnell, Convergence in Corporate Governance- Possible, But Not Desirable, 47 ViLL. L. REV.
341 (2002).
187 But reforms encouraging lower-level participation also matter. One place to start
is revising section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act. See the sources cited in note
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question is whether one wants to encourage employee-only boards, or an even mix
of employee and shareholder representatives, or simply a minority of employee
representatives.18 8 On first principles, each alternative has its virtues, but political
reality dictates focusing on the last possibility, minority employee representation. I
would not suggest mandatory employee representation; rather, governments could
provide positive incentives, such as a subsidy or tax break, to businesses that have
employee board representatives. Or, one could adopt default rules18 9 that prescribe
employee representation on the board, but allow firms to opt out of the default
should enough of their workers agree. One might want to require that employees
reaffirm that opting out periodically. An even milder intervention would retain
existing default rules that do not feature employee primacy, but make it easier than
now for businesses to opt in to forms of employee participation. For instance, a
relatively well worked out legal scheme can be made available to employee-run
firms; interesting recent research suggests that the availability of such "menu"
options can strongly affect the outcomes observed1 90 and it would be helpful to study
the Massachusetts experience with a statute for worker cooperatives in this
context. 191
Some of the arguments for employee participation suggest benefits to
participation at a lower level of decision-making than the board of directors. One
might then look to a different part of the German experience and consider the
possibility of encouraging works councils.192 These would operate at the plant or
173.
188 Sharing the election of directors between shareholders and employees is often
called co-determination, and is far more common in Europe than in the U.S., particularly in
Germany, where forms of co-determination are required for firms above a certain size. There
is a vast literature on co-determination, which is obviously relevant to this paper's topic, but
exploring that literature would take us too far away from my central argument. For some
good discussions of co-determination, see THEODOR BAUMS & PETER ULMER, EDS., EMPLOYEES'
Co-DETERMINATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2004); Katherine Pistor,
Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999); Stefan Prigge, A
Survey of German Corporate Governance, IN COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF
THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 943 (K.J. Hopt et. al. eds. 1998).
189 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering
Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 383 (2007).
190 See Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical
Examination, working paper.
191 See Ellerman & Pitegoff, supra note 181.
192 See Befort, supra note 94.
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office level rather than corporation-wide, and would involve employees in making a
more limited set of decisions over matters that more immediately affect them, such
as health and safety or workplace rules. In keeping with the experimental flavor of
my suggestions, one could start with works councils that cover only a narrow range
of topics, and if the experiment seemed to be working expand their scope over time.
Once again, I would not require that businesses adopt works councils, but rather
encourage them as with the suggestions for board representation: through tax
incentives, subsidies, default rules, or menu options. At the very least, we should
reform section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act to allow more
experimentation. 193
Another possibility is to promote employee primacy through giving
employees standing to bring derivative actions. 94 As noted above, one of the major
ways that current corporate law achieves shareholder primacy is through allowing
only shareholders to bring derivative actions. 95  A full-fledged change from
shareholder primacy to employee primacy thus needs to re-consider who should be
allowed to sue on behalf of the corporation. Such a change would raise concerns
about strike suits and the abuse of such suits to further goals that help employees at
the expense of other constituencies. However, the same sorts of mechanisms that we
currently use to tame shareholder derivative actions could also limit employee
derivative actions. This question deserves more detailed study.
Should these suggested reforms be pursued at the state or national level?
The difficulty of estimating the costs and benefits suggests experimenting with
different approaches in different jurisdictions -one of the key benefits of
jurisdictional choice within the U.S.196 and of differences in corporate governance
between countries. 197 On the other hand, if one fears that state competition entails
193 See supra note 173.
194 A derivative action occurs where an officer, director, or controlling shareholder
has engaged in action that has hurt the corporation. Generally, it is the board that has the
authority to protect the corporation where it has been hurt. However, where those who
caused the harm dominate the board, it may be unrealistic to expect board action.
Recognizing this, the law allows for derivative actions to be brought on behalf of the
corporation when the board will not do so. In American corporate law, only shareholders
have standing to bring a derivative suit.
195 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. For further discussion, see supra note
117.
196 See Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. Corp. L. 99
(2004).
197 See McDonnell, supra note 186.
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that states will not adequately consider the interests of employees in setting
corporate governance rules,198 then we might need to implement these suggestions at
the national level. Whichever works. It may well be, at the moment anyway, that
the most feasible place to start is with a few large, liberal states in which there are
enough sympathetic legislators and which are not terribly invested in the
competition for corporate charters -California and New York, for instance. On the
other hand, international competition and the threat of losing capital and business
due to globalization may prevent even the federal government from acting.
Conclusion
I have brought together the traditionally separate conceptual worlds of law
and economics and civic republicanism,199 and used them to explore the choice
between shareholder primacy and employee primacy. I hope to have shed light on
law and economics, civic republicanism, and corporate governance.
By bringing together law and economics with civic republicanism, I want to
encourage a broadened understanding of the former. The impact of different
corporate governance systems on the environment, politics, and even social values
are all topics that economics can speak to. In doing so, law and economics does lose
some of its distinctiveness, and merges into other forms of "law and" -law and
society, law and political theory, law and psychology, law and history, and so on.
That is not such a bad thing. Each discipline has something to teach the others, and
all shed some light on the law.
In comparing shareholder primacy with employee primacy, we have seen
many potential benefits from getting employees involved in corporate governance.
However, there are costs as well, and the size of both costs and benefits is uncertain
and contested. I believe that on the whole the arguments favor action to promote
more employee participation. However, the action should be modest, reversible,
and experimental. Rather than trying to impose employee primacy on all
corporations within the U.S., we should encourage participation through subsidies,
tax breaks, menus, and default rules.
Also of interest is the fact that the arguments favoring employee primacy
198 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2491 (2005); McDonnell, supra
note 198.




over shareholder primacy have, in many cases, suggested greater problems with
shareholder primacy in public corporations than in close corporations. Small
businesses run by a few active shareholders have many of the social benefits of
employee primacy. Indeed, had we broadened our scope to include partnerships as
well as corporations, we would have seen even closer affinities to employee primacy.
The comparison makes employee primacy look less radical than it might otherwise
appear, as does the tie with civic republicanism, an ideological strain whose roots go
back to the American Revolution and beyond, and which has re-appeared in various
strains throughout American history. Active participation in matters that affect
one's life, aversion to extreme inequality, shared deliberation to reach a public good,
the gains from a virtuous life spent working with others -these are all values that
Americans have recognized from the New England town meeting to It's a Wonderfiul
Life. How to reconcile these goods with a modern, technological market economy
dominated by large corporations has been a central tension of American economic
and political life at least since the rise of large industrial corporations after the Civil
War. Employee primacy is one attractive response to that central tension.
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